The Amended Covenant of the League of Nations

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THE "Amended Covenant of the League of Nations" having been adopted by the Paris Conference, the question is now before the American people whether it shall be adopted or rejected by them. Most of the objections, based upon mere form, have now been removed. It is still contended, however, that if the United States should join the league it would thereby become subject to the control of the organs of the league and would find its freedom of action restricted in a manner unfavorable to its best interests. It is even argued that our national safety and independence would be endangered. These objections have been advanced by men whose opinion is entitled to weight and they deserve serious and thoughtful consideration.

It is necessary to consider the exact nature of the proposals which the league covenant makes in order to ascertain how far they are likely to improve international relations and to what extent the objections advanced may be just. The league covenant contains so many separate articles framed in technical language that it is confusing to consider it article by article; it will be much simpler to consider the proposals, stated rather as objects of the covenant. Having regard to the restraint or compulsion imposed upon the members of the league, the basis of the objections now urged, the proposals of the covenant may be divided into two classes: First, those whereby a nation binds itself to do or not do certain specified things, either absolutely or under certain contingencies; second, those whereby a nation agrees to be bound by the action of an institution set up by the league.

Those provisions of the covenant merely offering opportunity to league members to take voluntary action along certain lines, but without compulsion or relating to matters to be hereafter dealt with by the league, are not discussed, as not open to the objections now under consideration.

I. OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED UPON LEAGUE MEMBERS BY THE BINDING FORCE OF THE COVENANT

a. *Enforced Examination of International Disputes and Delay before Commencing Hostilities*

Many of the terms of the covenant relate to one great purpose —to compel nations before commencing war against each other to submit the cause at issue to the examination of an international court or council, as the case may be, and to delay hostilities at least three months after the decision has been rendered.

This obligation, imposed upon all members of the league by the binding force of the treaty, is entirely apart from any duty to obey the decree of a court or the recommendation of a council—a matter to be separately considered. The requirement of an examination of the dispute and the enforcement of a delay which altogether would not be less than nine months after the public statement of the case to court or council would be almost certain to prevent war in most cases. The examination of facts clears away misunderstandings, discloses the falsity of claims made without foundation, and lays bare the hypocrisy of states masking aggressive aims under pretended grievances. Even more important is the necessary delay after the case has been stated to the world. The delay gives time for the passions to cool, for the cost to be counted and for that element of the community opposed to the war to make its influence felt. Time always makes for peace; it is the great pacificator, as well as the great healer. It has been said, and truly, that if but a few days had been given for discussion, after the opening scenes of the late war, it probably would have been averted altogether. It is as near a certainty as human intelligence can foresee, that, if the provisions of the covenant on this point are enforced as written in the treaty, the probability of war will be much diminished.

This is admitted by the opponents of the league, but objections have been heard to the method of enforcement. It is recognized that in order that the treaty may be of binding effect, all members of the league must agree to enforce it. It is objected, however, that the treaty would bind the United States to send its armies abroad, even if the cause they were summoned to support was not a just one; that the United States would be obliged to fight but could not decide for itself upon which side.

If a nation should violate this covenant and attempt to use violence in the furtherance of its own ends, without submitting its cause to court or council, as provided by the treaty, there could be but one side. The use of violence under these circumstances would not only be a gross violation of a solemn obligation —it would be a disturbance of the peace of the world, which the United States, as well as all other nations, would be bound to condemn and oppose. But although a term in the treaty obligating the United States to send troops for such a purpose might well be defended, there is no such obligation in the treaty. The stipulations regarding this matter are contained in Article XVI. The members of the league agree, in the event of such violation, immediately to subject the offending state

> to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the league or not.

This is the extent of the absolute undertaking of any member of the league. It agrees to treat the offending state as an outlaw, so far as commercial or social intercourse with it is concerned; it does not agree to take up arms against it. The article, however, proceeds:

> It shall be the duty of the council in such case to recommend what effective military or naval force the members of the league shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league.

This is no more than a provision for a recommendation by the council. The members of the league do not agree to furnish the armed forces recommended or any armed forces for the purpose of subduing the offending state. It is probable that such forces would be furnished by the United States, but Congress would have to decide in favor of it before it could be done; and, if not done, it would be no violation of the treaty. It is therefore apparent that the supposed obligation to furnish troops regardless of the character of the controversy does not in fact exist.

There is nothing new in the character of restraint voluntarily submitted to by the United States under these terms of the covenant. It is our settled practice to make treaties with other nations, agreeing to submit disputes to examination and decision

and to allow a specified time to elapse before hostilities are begun. To enter into a general treaty of that character with substantially all the other nations of the earth would be no departure from this practice, but a continuance of it. In so doing, the United States should be willing to assume its full share of the burden of enforcing the treaty. However, the obligation to do so under the terms of this covenant, goes no further than to require the exercise of what is commonly called economic pressure, and calls only for the use of troops or ships of war as a result of the recommendation—not the command—of the council, and only in case the properly constituted authorities of the United States so decide.

b. *Limitation of Armaments*

Another obligation which the members of the league enter into by the terms of the treaty relates to the limitation of armaments. It is recognized that the burden of maintaining great armies and navies, which has rested so heavily upon Europe, is not only an unnecessary and gross imposition upon the people, but that "the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety."

The members of the league agree to disclose to each other the condition of their industries which are capable of being adapted to war-like purposes, and the scale of their armaments. They agree that there shall be full and frank interchange of information as to their military and naval programs. There is no restriction upon the members of the league as to the size of their armaments until after they have themselves agreed to the restriction. The council is to determine what military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable for each nation. This determination, however, is not binding upon any state unless and until the state accepts it by its own free act. Thereafter, not on account of any action of the council, but by the express terms of the treaty, the state agrees not to overstep the limits which it has itself accepted.

These provisions are so reasonable and lend themselves so plainly to the preservation of peace, that no opponent of the league has come forward to object to them.

c. *Publicity of Treaties*

Another provision by which the members of the league are bound is that they will make their treaties with one another

public; and that no such treaty or international engagement shall be binding unless registered in the manner provided by the league, so as to become public property.

This provision cannot fail to have a beneficial effect upon the relations existing between states. Secret treaties have been at the bottom of many wars. And while secret agreements cannot, perhaps, be prevented by this term of the covenant, the very fact that they are declared to be not binding will deprive them of much of their injurious effect upon international politics.

d. *Guaranty of Territorial Integrity and Political Independence*

Article X of the covenant, which has raised so much controversy, provides that the members of the league

> undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all states, members of the league. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of any such aggression, the council shall advise upon the means by which the obligation shall be fulfilled.

Several serious objections have been advanced against this article. Perhaps the most serious is that a positive obligation by the United States to protect the territorial integrity of a member of the league against external aggression obligates the United States to defend by force of arms any such aggression against that state. This, it is said, would have the effect of compelling the United States to send troops abroad in obedience to the treaty on all such occasions and whether it believed the cause of the attacking state to be just or unjust.

It has been suggested in reply that the effect of this clause of the treaty is no more than to reënforce the provision of Article XVI—that members of the league will oppose by economic pressure, and, if they so decide, by armed force, a state which has refused to submit its case to court or council. This is not quite accurate, however, as a case might arise in which a state had submitted the dispute to court or council, had given the requisite delay, and still insisted upon proceeding with a war which would violate the political independence or territorial integrity of a member of the league. It might do this under circumstances which would not be a violation of the covenant (as where there was no unanimous recommendation of the council) and, there-

fore, the members of the league would not be bound to oppose it under Article XVI. They might, however, be called in under Article X to defend the state attacked because its territorial integrity or political independence was threatened.

It has also been objected that the apparent effect of Article X would be to maintain permanently the political organization of the world in the way it is fixed at the conclusion of this war, which is an impossibility. Nations live and die like human beings; they have their beginnings, their periods of greatest prosperity, and their periods of decline. In all human probability nations will rise and fall in the future as they have in the past. This necessarily means that political control of territory will change, and in some cases political entities will cease to exist.

It is apparent on examination that Article X rises like a lone peak above the other provisions of this covenant. It is in effect an absolute prohibition of war for territory or for the destruction of a political entity. It would be only a short step beyond this to forbid war altogether for any purpose, and require all states to use legal methods in acquiring objects which they may have in view. That this principle will sometime be established is a certainty. It is, however, a serious question whether it can precede the establishment of an international court and the acceptance of the principles of international law as governing relations between states. Before a prohibition of war for these or any specified objects can be made effective, there must be in actual operation another and better means of adjusting international differences. You cannot prohibit change by law. You can require change to take place only in accordance with certain rules or principles, but these principles must be recognized as applying in such cases and competent tribunals must be in existence ready to enforce them before all other means of change can be effectively forbidden. When an international court has become well established and has demonstrated its ability to decide international questions judicially—and not merely by way of compromise—and when the principles of international law are better settled and are recognized as really having the force of law, a prohibition of war will be more likely to be effective. Until that time such a prohibition as is contained in this guarantee of territorial integrity and po-

litical independence of the members of the league must be considered somewhat as a temporary provision intended to preserve existing conditions for a limited time only. It was no doubt in recognition of these facts and mainly on account of Article X that the provision was inserted enabling a state to withdraw from its obligations upon giving two years' notice.

It would clearly be appropriate as a part of the treaty of peace for the signatories to guarantee the boundaries fixed by the treaty for at least a temporary period; such guarantees to be enforced by the states in the best position to do so. It might have been better if Article X had been inserted in the treaty of peace, but in view of the possibility of amendment and the opportunity to withdraw on two years' notice, its inclusion in the covenant is not sufficient ground for rejecting it. The treaty of peace and the covenant will be adhered to by the same nations in the first instance, and after all, it is not a vital objection that this guarantee is included in the one rather than in the other.

Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the covenant contemplates the establishment of an international court and that the assembly will be competent to deal with questions of international law. It is, therefore, not too much to hope that when the new system is placed in operation, prompt steps may be taken to establish an international court and to develop international law, so that within the course of a few years machinery will exist capable of dealing with disputes between nations involving questions of territorial integrity or political independence. Thereafter the inclusion of Article X as a permanent obligation in the covenant for a league of nations will be no longer objectionable.

II. COMPULSION OR RESTRAINT OF LEAGUE MEMBERS THROUGH THE ACTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

a. *Decisions of an International Court*

Although it goes beyond existing practice in some particulars, the covenant is far behind in the matter of the judicial settlement of international disputes. This matter has been especially pointed out by Senator Root. The United States has so frequently submitted questions of great importance to the decision of international tribunals, that it has become our usual practice. We have not only submitted questions of minor importance, but

many which were distinctly of major importance, involving questions of the class commonly described as those which concern the honor, the vital interests or the independence of states. Among such may be mentioned the Geneva Arbitration over the Alabama claims, the numerous boundary disputes between the United States and Great Britain—especially in connection with the Canadian boundary—and the Fisheries Cases. The United States now has many treaties with other nations providing for the submission of questions arising between them to judicial examination and decision.

Not only the United States, but other nations have made great progress in the same direction. At the first Hague Conference the principal nations of the world agreed upon the establishment of a permanent international court of arbitration, which has done useful service. At the second Hague Conference, held in 1907, substantially all the civilized powers of the world agreed upon the constitution of an international court, designated the International Court of Arbitral Justice, and the only reason it was not then established was because an agreement could not be reached as to the method of appointing judges. Subsequently progress was made toward the establishment of an international prize court, although it never actually came into operation.

This shows the trend of modern thought toward the inevitable conclusion that questions arising between independent nations should be decided according to principles of right and justice rather than by violence. Experience has demonstrated that there is no insuperable bar to the judicial decision of such questions, even though involving what has been termed the honor and the vital interests of the contending powers.

With this history it was to have been supposed that the covenant establishing a league of nations would have provided specifically for the establishment of an international court (which had already been agreed upon in form by all the nations of the world) and would further have provided means whereby nations would be required to submit disputes—if not all, certainly all those of a justiciable character—to such court for decision. The provisions of the covenant, however, in this regard are very disappointing. No court is provided for. Article XIV states that the council shall formulate plans for the establishment of such a

court, but that is by no means so advanced a step as was taken by the second Hague Conference twelve years ago. It is further provided that:

> The high contracting parties agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise between them, which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole matter to arbitration.

This provision, however, when analyzed, is seen to amount to very little. The only questions which the league members agree to submit to arbitration are those "which they recognize to be suitable" for such submission. The covenant is somewhat strengthened by the declaration in the amended article to the effect that certain classes of cases are "generally suitable for submission to arbitration." This amendment, however, while it may serve as a suggestion to league members who have disputes with one another, is distinctly not binding. If it does not desire to submit a question to arbitration, it is apparent on the face of the article that a nation can avoid doing so by refusing to recognize it to be "suitable." The article is of no binding force whatever. The covenant would be greatly strengthened and would offer much better hope for its future successful operation if it provided for the establishment of a court to which questions of a judicial nature should of necessity be submitted.

A method should also be provided whereby the judicial character of the question of dispute may be ascertained either by the court or some other appropriate body. Thus it would not be left to the decision of the states concerned, who, if they do not wish to arbitrate, can always decide that the question is not one of a justiciable character.

Although there is no specific provision on the subject, it is a matter of gratification that the language of the covenant is sufficiently broad to enable the council or assembly to undertake the important duty of codifying, harmonizing and determining the principles of international law to be applied by the court when established. Both these bodies are to meet at regular intervals and both have jurisdiction over "any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world." This jurisdiction is clearly broad enough so that either body could assume the important and necessary duty of considering ques-

tions of the character mentioned affecting the firm establishment and growth of international law.

Although the framers of the covenant did not see their way clear to provide for the immediate establishment of an international court, it is to be hoped and is confidently expected that after the conclusion of peace one of the first duties to be undertaken by the council will be the establishment of such court along the lines of the recommendation made at the second Hague Conference.

While the provisions of the covenant in this regard are not as complete as they might be, they offer great hope for the future, and it is clear that they impose no restraint upon the freedom of action of the United States. Therefore, any objection based upon this supposition is without foundation.

b. *Recommendations of the Council or Assembly*

The covenant, although not really requiring the submission of any question to judicial decision or arbitration, does undertake to require the submission to the council or to the assembly of all questions not submitted to arbitration. The question, therefore, arises how far and under what circumstances will a nation be bound by the recommendation made by the council or assembly? There is no compulsion or restraint of any kind unless the decision is unanimous, excluding the parties to the dispute. If the recommendation is so made, the only compulsion which then rests upon the parties involved in the dispute is by virtue of their agreement that neither will go to war with the other, if it has complied with the recommendation. It is further provided that if either party refuses to comply "the council shall propose measures necessary to give effect to the recommendation." This last is obviously a mere statement that further proposals may be made by the council; there is no agreement by the parties to obey the recommendation and no agreement by the other league members that they will require them to do so. If there is no unanimous report, the only restraint upon the parties to the dispute is to await the proper time before beginning hostilities, if they are determined to use force.

It is this article, which has aroused so much discussion and so much opposition upon the supposition that it threatens serious

interference with questions of domestic policy or with foreign policies, such as the Monroe Doctrine. As to domestic policies the matter is dealt with by the amended article, which provides:

> If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them and is found by the council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party the council shall so report and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

In case, therefore, a domestic question is involved in a dispute, such as, for example, the policy of a state regarding immigration, it will not be considered by the council if it finds the question to be one solely within the domestic jurisdiction of either party. This decision must be unanimous to be effective, but if not unanimous, and the council proceeded to consider the case, the member of the council who found that the question was of a domestic character, would undoubtedly refuse to agree to the recommendation as being beyond the jurisdiction of the council. It seems clear that if a question is one which can fairly be said to be of a domestic character, and if one member of the council finds that it is of such character, there will be no unanimous recommendation, and therefore no compulsion regarding that matter. It is therefore evident that there is no danger of domestic questions being interfered with under the terms of the amended covenant.

A clause is also included in the amended treaty which is intended to exclude cases involving the Monroe Doctrine from consideration by the council. This is in the form of a separate article, which reads as follows:

> Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.

If it be admitted that the covenant endangers the Monroe Doctrine, it must be confessed that the provisions of Article XXI do not clearly remove the danger. If it be assumed that the validity of the Monroe Doctrine is not affected by anything contained in the covenant, it does not necessarily follow that the doctrine would be recognized and enforced in all cases. For example, if Germany should undertake to acquire territory in the Western Hemisphere by purchase and the United States should object, a dispute would exist, to which the United States,

Germany and the owner of the territory about to be acquired, would be parties. The United States would base its objections on the ground that the acquisition of the territory would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and a menace to its safety. The provision of Article XXI is not a clear statement that in such a case the validity of the Monroe Doctrine would be recognized and applied and a decision given against the acquisition of territory by Germany. The declaration that the validity of the Monroe Doctrine is not affected by the covenant is not quite the same thing as declaring it to be valid and enforceable; nor is the mere mention of it by name a sufficient determination as to its meaning. The decision might be that the Monroe Doctrine could not be considered to apply in the case in hand and that the general principles applicable to such cases would not permit a just objection by the United States on the ground that its safety was imperiled. The amendment proposed by Senator Root, whereby the acquisition of territory in the Western Hemisphere by European powers would be specifically prohibited, has the merit of greater clarity.

Laying aside the provisions of Article XXI, however, what danger is there of interference with the Monroe Doctrine? Under what circumstances can it reasonably be said that there is probability of a decision which would have the effect of interfering with or nullifying the Monroe Doctrine? A decision of the council, to be of any binding effect, must be unanimous, excluding the parties to the controversy. As the case can always be taken to the assembly, there must be in addition to a unanimous vote of the members of the council, a majority vote of the other members of the assembly. It is, of course, possible that all the members of the council and a majority of the assembly would agree to a recommendation which would have the effect of nullifying the Monroe Doctrine, notwithstanding the declaration of Article XXI that the validity of the Monroe Doctrine is not to be affected by the covenant. The probability of such a decision, however, is so remote that under all the circumstances it may reasonably be said to be negligible.

It has been argued, however, by some opponents of the league that no questions of general policy or involving the vital interests of the United States (and this would include questions affecting

the Monroe Doctrine) should in any event be submitted to the council for examination. No precise effort has been made to define the class of cases meant, but it is broadly claimed that the United States should reserve to itself the right to determine all important questions of this kind and that it should not permit them even to be discussed by an international council. Strangely enough this argument has been advanced by persons who at the same time assert that they are in favor of *a* league of nations that would assist in preserving the peace of the world. It is apparent almost without discussion that a contract to submit questions to a court or council for examination, but reserving the right to refuse to submit an undefined class of cases involving the vital interests or important policies of the nations signing the contract would be of no binding force whatever. In the not-remote past general treaties of arbitration concluded between states generally reserved therefrom questions affecting the vital interests, independence or honor of the contracting parties. Such a treaty is of no binding force, as experience has shown. If a state does not wish to arbitrate it may escape the obligation of the contract by asserting that the question affects its honor, its vital interests or its independence. It would be quite useless to make any covenant at all if the states were to reserve from the consideration of the court or the council an undefined class of cases to be determined by themselves.

Admitting that there is a possibility that the council or assembly will in important cases affecting the vital interests of the United States make decisions unfavorable to the United States, the question is whether the United States should, under these circumstances, become a party to this covenant. On the one hand are to be considered the great advantages resulting from the institution of legal relations between states, with consequent greater security to the United States as well as to the other nations of the world. There are also to be considered the many advantages naturally flowing from this condition; greater freedom of commerce, the lessening of the burden of taxation incident to the maintenance of military establishments, and other matters of the same character. But even more important than these is the fact that the new order would go far toward removing the probability of war and establishing international relations on a basis of right.

As against these great advantages what is the danger to the United States? Only this—that there might be an interference with some policy or with some desired object, which, however, could only take place by a concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. That we should have a dispute with another nation which we could not settle by negotiation.

2. That after we had refused arbitration the case had been submitted to and examined by the council and by the assembly, and a report made, concurred in by all members of the council and a majority of the assembly, recommending a course of action unfavorable to the contention of the United States.

3. That this recommendation was satisfactory to our opponent in the dispute and that it complied with it.

4. That in order to maintain its policy, it would be necessary for the United States to take up arms against its opponent, which would be a violation of the covenant, and, therefore, the United States would find itself unable to do so because of its contract.

If the facts were such that the United States could still maintain its position without taking up arms, it would be under no obligation to obey the recommendation and there would be no interference with its rights—unless the other nations should, after consultation, decide to take steps to enforce the recommendation. This, by the very terms of the covenant, would require a further consideration and a further agreement, as there is no obligation in the covenant to do it.

The terms of the treaty in this regard have been thus analyzed to show how exceedingly remote is the probability that there would be any interference with any reasonable policy of the United States. It is improbable that any question would come up that we could not settle by negotiation, or if we could not settle, and refused to arbitrate, that a unanimous recommendation of the council would be made against us; or if by maintaining our position we could defeat the recommendation of the council, that measures would be undertaken to coerce us, especially in the absence of agreement to take this course.

But admitting that all these unlikely conditions might come to pass, should not the United States be willing to trust, to this extent at least, to the reasonableness and fair-mindedness of the

representatives of the other nations of the world? It should be recollected that they will propose to put themselves in the same position as ourselves. They have many more policies likely to clash with the interests of other powers, than we have. They have interests to guard which are as sacred as our own. If they are willing, for the sake of greater security in the world and for the advancement of civilization, to agree to take the risk of the judgment of their fellows, under the circumstances indicated, we should be willing to do the same.

The idea of a league of nations is not new. We who live in Pennsylvania take a special pride in the fact that William Penn proposed a very similar association of nations in the pamphlet which he published in 1693. But a league embodied in a treaty seriously proposed to be signed by the principal powers of the world is new and a marvelous stride forward in the progress of civilization. Such a proposal always has its protagonists and its antagonists, and the present is no exception. There are those who hail it as a great event—which it is—and who are disposed to accept it without examination. There are those who oppose it as a most dangerous innovation, find nothing good in it, magnify the errors of draftsmanship and possible dangers, and even affect to believe that American independence is threatened. This is not the way to discuss a proposal of this kind. It should be examined carefully, but not hypercritically; sympathetically, but not with the determination to see nothing wrong in it. In a word, common sense should be used in the discussion over the League of Nations as well as over the more common affairs of life.

So examined, what do we find? For the first time in the history of the world the principal nations have put in the form of a document a proposal that they should combine together in the effort to preserve better order in the future and to avoid a repetition of the awful experience through which the world has just passed. Considering the number and character of the nations which have expressed a willingness so to combine, this of itself is an event of the first magnitude. No super-state is proposed, but a mere agreement among sovereign states in the interest of a better world for all of them. There is no proposal to take away their liberty of action, but to protect them in the natural and inherent right they now have to live their own lives and work out their national

destinies without the constant menace and threat of attack which many of them have endured so long. The principal method proposed to accomplish this end, which all must approve, is a restraint upon all nations, forbidding them to fight until they have submitted their cause to examination and delay. No one can question the wisdom of this provision. No one can doubt the duty of the United States to join in it and be bound by it. It would be no restraint upon the United States, because we would always do this in any case, or we would belie our history. No one can doubt that the enforcement of examination and delay would greatly tend to prevent war. It might not always succeed, but the probabilities are that it would. It is highly improbable that any interference with the just policies of the United States would result. There are some defects in the covenant, but there is no great danger in it. When carefully analyzed, the dangers which loom so large when proclaimed from the public platform, either disappear altogether or become negligible in character. Even admitting their presence, they are not to be considered, as against the beneficent effect which the adoption of this covenant would have in lightening the burden of armaments and freeing the world from the scourge of war.

If this covenant as amended is accepted by the other powers negotiating at Paris, it is unthinkable that it should be rejected by the United States. The United States, throughout its entire history, has sought to be, and has been in a very real sense, the leader in the cause of peaceable international settlements. Not only has it shown a willingness to submit its cases to examination and decision, but it has urged this course upon others. The occasions upon which presidents and secretaries of state and other officers, and the Congress of the United States and the legislatures of the various states have urged upon the world the acceptance of the principle of arbitration of international disputes could scarcely be enumerated in this paper. If the country which has made such great profession in this great cause should refuse to follow where the military powers of Europe lead, it would be the darkest spot on her history.

But there is no danger that this will be the result. Even the most severe critics of the League of Nations are now prefacing their remarks by the statement that they are in favor of *a*

league, and their prophecies of evil if this covenant is adopted, are becoming less and less insistent. The covenant in deference to the objections has been amended according to the best judgment of the men who are at Paris earnestly endeavoring to bring about a just and permanent peace, and the United States will not refuse its approval.